Households' carbon footprints are unequally distributed among the rich and poor due to di erences in the scale and patterns of consumption. We present distributional focused carbon footprints for Chinese households and use a carbon-footprint-Gini coe cient to quantify inequalities. We find that in 2012 the urban very rich, comprising 5% of population, induced 19% of the total carbon footprint from household consumption in China, with 6.4 tCO 2 /cap. The average Chinese household footprint remains comparatively low (1.7 tCO 2 /cap), while those of the rural population and urban poor, comprising 58% of population, are 0.5-1.6 tCO 2 /cap. Between 2007 and 2012 the total footprint from households increased by 19%, with 75% of the increase due to growing consumption of the urban middle class and the rich. This suggests that a transformation of Chinese lifestyles away from the current trajectory of carbon-intensive consumption patterns requires policy interventions to improve living standards and encourage sustainable consumption.
T
he growing climate crisis 1 shows that becoming wealthy, while enabling a clean-up of the local environment 2 , drives economic activity and subsequently carbon emissions, often in distant places 1, 3, 4 . The concept of a carbon footprint is increasingly used in the public debate on responsibility and mitigation of climate change to describe the direct and indirect carbon emissions of consumption along the international supply chain [5] [6] [7] [8] . To achieve absolute reductions of emissions fairly, proposals grounded in climate justice have been put forward to target high-emitting individuals across all countries [9] [10] [11] while ensuring minimum levels required for a human development 11 . In 2013 a growing global upper class of top 10% consuming households already contributed 40-51% of global emissions from fossil fuels and other sources with their footprints, a third of them in emerging economies such as China 10 . At the same time the global poor (lower 50% of global income distribution) are driving 10-13% of global greenhouse gas emissions 10 . Improved methods 12 , as employed in this study, provide important information for policymakers to explicitly consider the interactions and trade-offs between measures targeting inequality, poverty, climate mitigation, and towards sustainable lifestyles for the emerging middle class and rich households.
China, which recently announced a stronger focus on bolstering domestic consumption over its current export orientation, is steadily moving towards carbon-and resource-intensive consumer lifestyles, tracking the way of high-income countries 1, 5, 8, 13, 14 . The sheer scale of the Chinese economy means that the future global climate is strongly determined there 1, 14, 15 . Since the 1980s, a rapid reduction of the proportion of people living below the poverty line of 1.9 US dollar (2011 purchasing power parities) income per day has been achieved, from 88% in 1981 to 11% in 2014 16 . At the same time income inequality grew substantially to a Gini Index of 0.55 in 2010, leading to a stop of official reporting on the Gini coefficient for incomes 17 , an established indicator on income distributions. A clear urbanrural divide of energy consumption can be observed in China, where rural households often use traditional and locally polluting energy carriers, such as straw, wood or coal, while electricity and natural gas is slowly penetrating these areas 18, 19 . In urban areas, modern energy carriers such as electricity, natural gas and LPG are dominant, and mobility is the main driver of direct household energy use 18, 19 . Annually, approximately 20 million people move from rural to urban areas, and future population growth is projected to be concentrated in cities, which entails large new infrastructure and housing requirements 5 . Especially in urban areas, a sizeable middle class and a small segment of households with high incomes has emerged 5, 8, 20 , while large swaths of rural China and migrant workers coming to cities still largely remain in poverty 21 . Increasing consumption in urbanizing China has been identified as an important driver of household carbon footprints over the past 20 years, due to the growing urban population and incomes, while decreasing carbon intensity of the Chinese economy only weakly dampens these trends 5, 8, 22 . These growing disparities in incomes and carbon footprints are driven by government investment policies favouring coastal and urban areas 17 . But in a globally carbon-constrained future with the urgent need for absolute reductions of annual emissions 1, 23 , relying on economic growth to lift all boats while also decreasing inequality and improving human development can become very challenging. Clearly, decarbonizing the energy system via production-focused efficiency measures and energy-pricing reforms is essential 3, 24, 25 . But developing carbon-free lifestyles beyond the current trajectory of increasing carbon footprints while becoming wealthy will require more substantial debates on the limits of green consumerism and the potential towards sustainable consumption 11, 20, [26] [27] [28] . Herein we present the unequal distribution of carbon footprints between Chinese households along national and international supply chains for 13 income groups (5 rural and 8 urban). We quantify inequality between urban-rural and 13 income groups with a carbon-footprint-Gini coefficient (CF-Gini), for the latest available years (2012 and 2007) . Gini coefficients are used to quantify inequality 10, 17, 29 and were applied to production-based territorial emissions 29 , cumulative historical territorial emissions 30 , interregional assessments of household footprints 7 , urban Chinese carbon footprints 20 , and estimates of household carbon footprints U r b a n , m i d d l e -h i g h U r b a n , r i c h U r b a n , v e r y r i c h R u r a l , a v e r a g e U r b a n , a v e r a g e C h i n a , a v e r a g e across countries 10, 12 . For income inequality and carbon footprints an inverse relationship was found [31] [32] [33] [34] [35] [36] . We utilize a detailed Chinese Input-Output Table with the latest, substantially revised Chinese emissions statistics 37, 38 and a Multi-Regional Input-Output Model (GTAP 9 database) for all other countries. Emissions data sets cover carbon emissions from fossil fuels and cement production.
From a production-based territorial perspective, Chinese carbon emissions are 6.7 tons of per capita in 2013 37 . However, from a consumption-based perspective, the majority of Chinese emissions are related to capital investments (48%) and exports (20%) as main drivers 3, 22 , while households induce only 17% of the national footprint in 2012. We find that the average Chinese household footprint is only 1.7 tCO 2 /cap in 2012, more than double the Indian average (0.9 tCO 2 /cap), similar to the Brazilian average (1.5 tCO 2 /cap), but one quarter of that in the EU27 (6.7 tCO 2 /cap) and one sixth of that in the USA (10.4 tCO 2 /cap) ( Fig. 1 and Table 1 ). However, due to high income inequality in China 17 , 5.3% of the Chinese population, the very rich urban dwellers, have carbon footprints of consumption at 6.4 tCO 2 /cap, nearly four times of the average Chinese. The three richest urban groups, 21% of Chinese population, induce 48% of the total Chinese household carbon footprint. At the same time rural China and the urban poor, 58% of the population, induce only 31% of the total household footprint, all below the national average of 1.7 tCO 2 /cap. The total household carbon footprint of 1,354 million Chinese is estimated at 2,332 Million tons of CO 2 . In comparison, the total footprint of 1,247 million Indians is only half (1,152 MtCO 2 ), while 500 million Europeans, 37% the population size of China, have 1.4 times the total footprint (EU27: 3,347 MtCO 2 ) and 312 million US-Americans, 23% the population of China, also have 1.4 times the total carbon footprint (3,262 MtCO 2 ) ( Table 1) .
Urban residents, 53% of the Chinese population, induce 75% of the national household carbon footprint in 2012. Their average per capita footprint is 2.4 tCO 2 ( Table 1 ). The top 5.3% very rich urban Chinese spend 7,237 US$ per year and have a per capita footprint of 6.4 tCO 2 -which is very similar to the national averages of OECD countries, that is, Japan (6.6 tCO 2 with 27,692 US$), Russia (5.9 tCO 2 and 7,585 US$), the EU27 average (6.7 tCO 2 and 21,082 US$) and Germany (7.6 tCO 2 with 20,374 US$) ( Fig. 1 and Table 1 ). This richest urban group comprises approximately 71 million people, or 5.3% of the entire Chinese population, inducing 19% of the total household carbon footprint in 2012 ( Table 1 ). The total footprint of that richest group amounts to 455 MtCO 2 , 1.6 times the entire Brazilian household footprint (290 MtCO 2 ). The second group, the urban rich, 5.3% of total Chinese population, spends approximately 4,298 US$ per capita and has an average footprint of 3.7 tCO 2 . The urban middle class, divided into three income groups, spends 1,725-3,159 US$ and has a per capita footprint of 1.5-2.8 tCO 2 . In total, the two urban rich groups and middle class together induce 69% of the national Chinese household carbon footprint. At the same time the urban poor, divided into three groups, totalling 10.5% of Chinese population, spend only 650-1,270 US$ and have footprints of 0.6-1.1 tCO 2 /cap. This means their carbon footprints are below the Chinese (1.7 tCO 2 ) and Brazilian average (1.5 tCO 2 ) but similar to the Indian average (0.9 tCO 2 ), and in the same range as Chinese rural households. The extremely poor in urban areas have a footprint of only 0.5 tCO 2 /cap.
Consumption of Chinese rural households, 47% of the population, induces 25% of the national household carbon footprint in 2012 ( Table 1) . The average rural carbon footprint is 0.9 tCO 2 /capone-quarter of the urban average. Further decomposing the rural population into five income groups yields footprints of Carbon footprint (CF) elasticities were calculated using the basic income elasticity approach, where the relative change of each income groups CF/cap from the average CF/cap is divided by the relative change of each income groups expenditure/cap from the average exp/cap in 2012 (for details see Methods and Supplementary Information; US$ at 2011/2012 market exchange rates (MER)) (all numbers were rounded).
0.5-1.6 tCO 2 /cap. Even the richest rural households, 9.5% of the Chinese population, spend only 1,611 US$ per capita and have a footprint of 1.6 tCO 2 /cap, which is similar to the urban lower-middle class (1.5 tCO 2 /cap). The rural middle and middle-high classes have footprints of 0.8-1.1 tCO 2 /cap, spending 785-1,054 US$ per capita. The two poorest rural groups, 19% of the entire Chinese population, have footprints of 0.5-0.6 tCO 2 , which together is only 6% of the total national household carbon footprint, and less than the Indian average footprint. Between 2007 and 2012, the total Chinese household carbon footprint increased by 19% or 378 MtCO 2 , with 82% of these increases due urban consumption ( Table 1 ). The urban 'very rich' , 5.3% of population, took 21% of the total increase, almost the increase for all of rural China, with 47% of the population (80 versus 70 MtCO 2 ). Per capita footprints in urban areas increased on average by 2% from a relatively higher level, while those in rural areas increased by 28%. The poor in urban and rural areas, together 29.5% of population, increased their footprint by 16%, but induced only 10% of the increase in total household footprint. The two richest urban and one rural richest groups together, 20% of population, increased their footprints by 20%, thereby taking 40% of the total increase. The urban middle class induced 41% of the total increase.
Interestingly, for the carbon-footprint elasticities of consumption we find slightly elastic relationships for the middle class and richer urban income groups (0.97-0.98), while for the urban poor and rural groups we find proportional to inelastic relationships (1-1.13) ( Table 1) . For the urban very rich, a 1% increase in expenditure would lead to +0.98% in carbon footprints, while +1% increase of expenditures of the rural poor would lead to +1.11%. This means that coming out of poverty is relatively carbon-intensive, due to low-quality commercial energy such as coal, first purchases of appliances and so forth. Richer households tend to use growing incomes for higher-quality commercial energy (electricity, LPG, natural gas), and especially more goods and services, which are relatively less carbon-intensive. When comparing elasticities for 2007 and 2012, interestingly rural households become slightly more carbon-intensive, while for urban households the carbonfootprint elasticity decreased (see Supplementary Information). These patterns replicate across countries 7, 8, 19, 39 , where generally with rising affluence the marginal carbon intensity of consumption decreases, but larger overall expenditure still means higher total carbon footprints than less affluent households.
When looking at the contribution of each income group's consumption pattern to the total Chinese footprint, it becomes evident that the urban rich and middle class are driving the categories mobility, goods, and services, while footprints from food and housing are less unequal (Fig. 2) . For example, 78% of the total footprint of mobility, 74% for goods and 75% for services is due to the urban middle class and the two rich groups, although these income groups constitute only 42% of the population. At the same time the urban and rural poor together, which also amount to 29.5% population, induce only 7% of the mobility-related emissions and 10% of the total Chinese carbon footprints from goods as well as from services.
Finally, we quantify inequality between carbon footprints of Chinese income groups using Lorenz curves and carbon-footprintGini Indices. In a Lorenz curve the cumulative share of population is plotted against their cumulative footprints, where the Gini Index then quantifies the area under that curve. We find that CF-Gini indices for total and goods footprints are similarly unequally distributed as household expenditure in 2012 (around 0.4) (Fig. 3a) . We find higher inequality for carbon footprints of services (0.5) and mobility (0.6), while those for food and housing (0. (Fig. 3b) , except for rural food and housing-related carbon footprints, which is also the major contributor to increasing per capita footprints in rural areas (Fig. 3) . While urban inequality did not change significantly (Fig. 3b,c) , rural inequality increased (Fig. 3b,d) .
To encourage economic growth, China's government has enacted policies focusing on increased domestic consumption as a substitute for its declining growth in investment and exports, while also announcing an absolute emissions peak for 2030. Recently, Chinese emissions growth did slow down 37 , largely driven by a stabilization of coal use 13, 38 . Substantial policy efforts in carbon taxation, feedin tariffs for renewables, and accelerated deployment of renewables and nuclear have been modelled to achieve this stabilization of Chinese emissions at modest costs until 2030 25 , while most of these current Chinese climate policies consider regional inequality only by using differentiated goals between provinces. However, at the same time it is clear that stabilizing the climate at 1.5-2
• C will require unprecedented absolute global reductions of emissions over the next two to three decades 1, 15 . The slight decreases in expenditure inequality between Chinese households, mostly due to a small catch-up of rural households, is triggered by governmental subsidies to rural households' general purchase and income tax free policies. But our findings suggest that coming out of poverty is fairly carbon-intensive due to a larger carbon-footprint elasticity of consumption of the poorer income groups, strongly driven by their dirtier direct energy mix. However, much more problematic are the growing carbon footprints of the urban middle class and the rich, which together induce 69% of the total Chinese household footprint and rapidly westernize their lifestyles. It has been suggested that income redistribution in urban China could reduce aggregate carbon footprints while improving living standards and income inequality 20 . From the results in Table 1 we can estimate that simply redistributing expenditure to achieve equality at 1,762$/cap, which is −8% lower than the current average expenditure, would result in a −1% decrease of total household footprints, due to differential CF elasticities. Therefore, social and redistributive policies need to be understood as interacting with climate and energy policy, as well as with efforts towards enabling sustainable lifestyles for all 17, 20, 31, 36 . While the Chinese government is making efforts to build regional inequalities into climate policies from production efficiency and technology level approaches (for example, rich coastal versus poorer inland areas), this study reveals that there are substantial inequalities within these regions and along income groups. The CF-Gini could be useful for developing sustainable consumption programmes for those income groups which dominate the footprints of certain consumption areas, or for guiding policy design in achieving poverty alleviation while reducing emissions and increasing energy efficiency. Direct emissions from heating with coal or natural gas at present amount to 11% of the total footprint and 21% of the rural footprint. Some practical policies are designed to alleviate poverty and reduce emission at the same time. For example, Beijing municipality government set up a subsidization plan to implement a 'coal replacement by clean energy programme' for every rural household in 400 villages surrounding Beijing. By end of 2017, appropriately 4 million tonnes of coal consumption for residential usage will be saved, which is equivalent to 7 million tonnes of CO 2 emissions and 210 thousand tonnes of SO 2 . The emission reduction effort is the same as three years aggregated emission discharge by 66 thousand taxis in Beijing.
Usually, shifting consumer choices is seen as yielding substantial climate mitigation benefits, for example eating less (red) meat and more vegetarian diets, less to no fossil fuelled mobility, energy-efficient dwellings, and purchasing high(er)-quality longlived goods 40, 41 . Tapping these potentials requires substantial policy guidelines, careful policy designs and matching infrastructures. At present, direct mobility emissions from fuels make up only 3% of the total household footprint, most of it by the rich and urban middle class. But following 'on the road' American culture, there are increasingly demands for cheap 4 × 4 fleets by the Chinese middle class. Domestic car manufacturers are upgrading production lines to fulfil such demands. Beijing and Shanghai have implemented tailored policies to limit absolute gasoline fleets and encourage electric vehicle (EV) purchases with heavy subsidies. However, such policies ignore China's coal-dominant energy mix. China's gasoline vehicle replacement programme with EVs is not effective at present. In fact, evidence shows that the CO 2 emissions reduction in the petroleum sector is offset by the increase in CO 2 emissions in the electricity sector 42 . The EV programme can be effective only with significant changes in the Chinese energy mix towards renewables. Therefore, green consumerism alone (even with policy guidelines) cannot drive the entire production system towards sustainability, and more systemic approaches are necessary to achieve sustainable consumption and production 11, 26, 28 . More sustainable urban forms and spatial planning have been identified as important long-term factors towards facilitating low-carbon lifestyles, especially in growing cities which are currently expanding their infrastructures 5, 6, 43, 44 . Overall the required long-term transformations towards a netzero carbon society should be included into a national discourse about the currently dominant mode of ecological modernization, green growth and conspicuous consumer lifestyles 28 . The carbonintensive lifestyles of the wealthy are being emulated, and serve as role models, while investments in infrastructure and cities are made. Based on the CF elasticities (Table 1) , a hypothetical scenario of an expenditure catch-up of all Chinese households to the average urban rich expenditure pattern (that is, mobility by cars and planes and living with an average 90 m 2 per household) can be estimated, resulting in a tripling of the total Chinese household carbon footprint. A catch-up only to the average urban middle class would translate into a 58% increase of the total footprint. But in a carbon-constrained post-Paris COP21 future, high wellbeing and human development needs to be achieved while rapidly reducing total emissions 1, 13 . Reducing inequalities but preventing emissionintensive lifestyle westernization in populous developing countries can be a step forward to contribute global climate change mitigation. Cost-effectively using limited public and private funding for these societal goals will be crucial. Some countries have already achieved a high level of human development (HDI of >0.8) with an average carbon footprint of 1 ton per capita [45] [46] [47] , highlighting that pathways to livable and potentially more sustainable societies exist.
Methods
Methods and any associated references are available in the online version of the paper.
